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How Equality Constitutes Liberty:
The Alignment of CLS v. Martinez
by JULIE A. NICE*
Across the constitutional doctrines protecting individual liberty
from governmental interference, judicial inquiry often focuses on the
unequal infringement of liberty. Many of the most important
individual rights have emerged from the synergy between equality
and liberty.! At pivotal points in major constitutional
pronouncements, the United States Supreme Court has
acknowledged this linkage between liberty and equality.2 But the
Court has not yet provided any framework for understanding the
various ways that liberty and equality interrelate. Neither has any
consensus developed around any scholarly attempt to understand the
relationship between liberty and equality.3 Without any grand theory,
* Herbst Foundation Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law.
I offer my appreciation to the editors, the panelists, and other participants at the Hastings
Symposium held on October 1, 2010.
1. The classic examples include the early Substantive Due Process decisions in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
which involved the government's interference with the rights of parents to raise their
children by discriminating against their ability to educate children in parochial schools or
in the German language, respectively. Similarly, the Equal Protection decision in Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), effectively established constitutional protection of the
liberty to procreate by invalidating the state's "clear, pointed, unmistakable
discrimination" against procreation by armed robbers as compared to embezzlers. Id. at
541. In the contraception trilogy of decisions, the Court first used liberty to recognize a
right to contraception in the privacy of the marital home in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), and then used equality to extend this liberty to unmarried individuals in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and to minors in Carey v. Population Services
International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
2. For example, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court noted: "Equality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point
advances both interests." 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003).
3. Some important recent attempts include Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99 (2007) and Pamela S.
Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth Amendment, 33
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the search for understanding this important relationship is thus left to
induction, as scholars examine one case at a time to glean both
specific and general insights, resembling a sort of common law
constitutionalism.4 This common law approach has generated a
variety of possibilities. To briefly summarize the major options,
liberty and equality might be distinguished and treated as separate
and independent infringements,' one might be incorporated or
subsumed within the other, one might sequentially generate the
other,' the two might be combined or "stacked,"8 they might be
understood as interacting in a mutually constitutive manner,9 and/or
they simply might conflict with one another.
This article continues the inductive search for constitutional
meaning, specifically exploring how the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
understands the linkage between liberty and equality in the context of
expressive association."o Using a close examination of the Martinez
MCGEORGE L. REV. 473 (2002). My own modest prior effort explored the mutually
constitutive nature of equality and liberty by examining how rights are effectively
constituted in relation to the classes that do and do not hold them, and how classes are
effectively constituted in relation to the rights they do and do not hold. See Julie A. Nice,
The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-
Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209 (1999).
4. For a provocative recent effort toward a grand theory of free speech doctrine, see
Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of Free Speech Law, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 131 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7. See, for example, how the protection of liberty in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-86,
generated protection of equality in Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454-55, which resulted in
greater protection of liberty.
8. Compare, e.g., Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n. 1 (1990) (describing
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) as involving the hybrid combination of religious
liberty and parental liberty).
9. For a co-constitutive analysis of equality and liberty based on constitutive theory
developed by law and society scholars, see Nice, supra note 3, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. at
1222-1226.
10. For a comprehensive analysis of issues involved in expressive association cases,
see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1919 (2006). For a careful examination of concerns arising in the context of
education; Joan W. Howarth, Teaching Freedom: Exclusionary Rights of Student Groups,
42 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 889 (2009); see also Douglas Nejaime, Inclusion, Accommodation,
and Recognition: Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303 (2009). For a recent critique against favoring anti-
discrimination over group autonomy, see John D. Inazu, The Unsettling 'Well-Settled' Law
of Freedom of Association, 43 CoNN. L. REV. 149 (2010). For a call for more negotiation
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opinions and related decisions, as well as some cross-doctrinal
comparison, this article seeks to understand what was at stake in this
particular controversy and to explore the implications of the decision.
In parts I, II, and III, the article considers what may have enticed
CLS to pursue this claim to the Supreme Court, what doctrinal
alternatives were available for framing the decision, and what specific
choices the Justices made in analyzing the case. The article argues in
part IV that, while Martinez cannot be understood without
recognizing the factors of time, place, and money, these factors alone
do not suffice to explain the decision within the body of relevant
precedents. In particular, Part V reveals how some of the Justices
switched to the opposite reasoning in Martinez as compared to a
recent "sleeper" decision that upheld a state's action stripping the
prior right of local government employees to direct payroll
deductions for union political activity. Part VI explores why CLS did
not receive the same doctrinal treatment as the private associations
involved in a trilogy of sex-discrimination cases, while Part VII
explores why CLS did not enjoy the same result as the associations
involved in a duo of sexual orientation discrimination cases. Next in
parts VIII and IX the article considers what Martinez reveals about
how the Court treats the relationship between identity and ideology
and about how the Court treats the relationship between equality and
liberty. Finally, the article argues in part X that the Martinez decision
is best understood as aligning the treatment of incidental effects on
expressive association with the treatment of both incidental effects on
free exercise and disparate impact within equal protection.
I. The Dispute and the Enticement to Litigate
Perhaps surprisingly, the constitutional dispute between the
University of California, Hastings College of the Law ("Hastings")
and the student chapter of the Christian Legal Society ("CLS") began
in a mundane manner. Hastings, like nearly all law schools, imposed
a standard nondiscrimination requirement on its recognized student
organizations. Since the adoption of Hastings's nondiscrimination
policy in 1990, no student organization requested an exemption prior
to 2004.n The Christian law student organization at Hastings did not
prohibit openly gay members or request an exemption from the
and accommodation between religion and sexual orientation, see Martha Minow, Should
Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781 (2007).
11. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2980 (2010).
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nondiscrimination policy until 2004,12 when the national organization
of the Christian Legal Society began requiring student chapters to
prohibit "participation in or advocacy of" sexual relations outside of
heterosexual marriage.13 Following the CLS change in policy in 2004,
only a smattering of CLS chapters challenged the policies in court,
which in turn resulted in only a minimal circuit split between the
Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. 4 Even then, the circuit
split was far from heated, especially in light of the fact that the Ninth
Circuit panel resolved the dispute at Hastings in an unusual summary
decision comprising only two sentences." There was thus little
percolation among the lower courts before the U.S. Supreme Court
plucked this controversy for consideration from among the many
vying for its attention.
When the Supreme Court announced its decision upholding the
Hastings policy on June 28, 2010, the majority decision written by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg followed a rather technical path of
reasoning. Justice Ginsburg focused heavily on the facts of the
particular dispute as well as a careful parsing of First Amendment
doctrine. Even her framing of the question was somewhat bland:
"May a public law school condition its official recognition of a
12. Id. at 2990 n. 19 (describing testimony of CLS member who described an openly
gay student as "a joy to have" as a member during the 2003-2004 school year).
13. Id. at 2980 (describing national CLS policy requiring CLS chapter members and
officers to sign a "Statement of Faith" requiring adherence to the belief that sexual activity
may not occur outside of marriage between one man and one woman, and that this
requirement excludes membership by anyone who engages in "unrepentant homosexual
conduct"; id. at 3001 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing national CLS policy that
"unrepentant participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle is inconsistent
with an affirmation of the Statement of Faith, and consequently may be regarded by CLS
as disqualifying such an individual from CLS membership").
14. Compare Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006) (granting
preliminary injunction against Southern Illinois University School of Law's
nondiscrimination policy based on "strong evidence" the policy was not applied in a
viewpoint neutral manner) with Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane,
319 Fed. Appx. 645 (2009) (upholding the University of California, Hastings College of the
Law's nondiscrimination and all-comers policy as reasonable and viewpoint neutral). See
also Christian Legal Soc'y v. Eck, 625 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (D. Mont. 2009) (upholding
University of Montana School of Law's nondiscrimination and open membership
requirements as "viewpoint neutral" and "not intended to single out or limit Plaintiffs'
rights to free expression").
15. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. at 645-46 (stating, in its entirety: "The parties stipulate that
Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups-all groups must accept
all comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the mission of the
group. The conditions on recognition are therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable.
Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2008).").
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student-group-and the attendant use of school funds and facilities-
on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership
and leadership to all students?"16
Because the majority held CLS to its factual stipulation that
Hastings required registered student organizations to allow any
student to participate regardless of the student's status or beliefs," the
majority decision addressed only this "all-comers" policy. The
majority accordingly rejected the attempt by CLS and the dissenting
Justices to reach the question of the constitutionality of the
nondiscrimination policy as written, which prohibited only specified
categories of discrimination "on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation." 8
Justice Ginsburg selected forum analysis from the Court's speech
cases to frame the dispute, and she distinguished both the association
line of cases and the student recognition cases relied upon by CLS
and the dissenting Justices." She then conducted a detailed
application of the constitutional standard to the specifics of the
dispute and found the Hastings policy to be both reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.20 Along the way, Justice Ginsburg rejected CLS's
contention that the Free Exercise Clause offered protection from the
all-comers policy,2' as well as their argument on appeal that the record
raised the suspicion of "pretext." 22
Justice Ginsburg's doctrinal journeywork clearly did not pacify
Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote an impassioned dissent on behalf of
Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Clarence
Thomas, and himself. Justice Alito's accusations in dissent revealed
the heightened tension of this dispute among the Justices. Justice
Alito charged the majority with resting its analysis on the principle of
"political correctness."2  He accused the majority of providing a
16. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.
17. Id. at 2982.
18. Id. at 2979.
19. Id. at 2984-88.
20. Id. at 2988-95.
21. Id. at 2993 n.24 & 2995 n.27.
22. Id. at 2995 (explaining that the pretext issue was raised "in the first instance"
before the Supreme Court and therefore might not have been preserved, but remanding to
the Ninth Circuit to "consider CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is
preserved").
23. Id. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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"misleading portrayal" of the case, 24 "distort[ing] the record,"' and
"straying" from relevant precedent.26  He predicted that the
consequence of having to comply with the all-comers policy will be
"marginalization" of those religious groups who cannot "in good
conscience" comply, and that the decision is "a serious setback for
freedom of expression in this country."2 7  More pointedly, Justice
Alito insinuated that the majority's decision was based on "the
identity of the student group"8 and that the majority Justices, like
Hastings and the Ninth Circuit, had "treated" CLS in a discriminatory
manner.29 While Justice Ginsburg saved most of her retorts for
footnotes,30 she refused to pull one punch from the text when she
characterized one of Justice Alito's primary arguments as simply
"beyond dissenter's license."31
In short, the gap between the majority's ordinary doctrinal
analysis and the extraordinary potshots and retorts between the
opinions revealed the heightened tension between the majority and
dissenting Justices. No doubt the decision dealt a major blow to the
hopes harbored by CLS that its expressive or religious freedom would
trump the government's interest in nondiscrimination in this or other
contexts.
24. Id. at 3001.
25. Id. at 3006.
26. Id. at 3007.
27. Id. at 3019-20. Justice Alito added his concern that the decision reflects
international rather than domestic norms, which is surprising given that the majority did
not cite to international sources. He wrote, "Our First Amendment reflects a 'profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open. . . .' Even if the United States is the only Nation that shares this
commitment to the same extent, I would not change our law to conform to the
international norm. I fear that the Court's decision marks a turn in that direction." Id. at
3020 (internal citation omitted).
28. Id. at 3008.
29. Id. at 3020.
30. For example, Justice Ginsburg says the dissent "spills considerable ink," "indulges
in make-believe," "relies heavily" on one precedent but "elides" its point,
"mischaracterizes" the majority, "resists the import of [the limited public forum] cases,"
"fights the distinction between state prohibition and state support," and "presents a one-
sided summary of the record evidence." Id. at 2982 n.6, 2983 n.9, 2987 n.15, 2989 nn.16-17,
2995 n.29 (majority opinion). She also characterizes one of Justice Alito's arguments as
"desperate" and "warped." Id. at 2993 n.25.
31. Id. at 2991-92 ("It is beyond dissenter's license, we note again ... constantly to
maintain that nonrecognition of a student organization is equivalent to prohibiting its
members from speaking.").
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So why did CLS believe it could obtain a constitutional
exemption from university policies prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation and religion? The challenges brought by CLS
not only furthered the organization's advocacy against homosexuality
but also reflected recent First Amendment decisions from the U.S.
Supreme Court that favored discrimination against gays over
nondiscrimination and thus might have been interpreted as having
invited the claims of CLS. In particular, CLS might have been
enticed to extend the Supreme Court's reasoning from its unanimous
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc.,32 holding that Boston's St. Patrick's Day
parade organizers could exclude an openly gay Irish group from
marching so as to control the parade's message, as well as the 5-4
decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,33 holding that the Boy
Scouts could exclude a gay scoutmaster so as to control the
organization's message. Indeed, CLS specifically argued that who
speaks on its behalf colors what concept is conveyed," which seemed
to be drawn directly from the logic of Hurley and Dale. Specifically
relevant to the law school context, CLS also might have been
encouraged by the Court's unanimous decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum
for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., holding that law schools
do not have a First Amendment right to exclude military recruiters
who discriminate against openly gay applicants in violation of the
schools' nondiscrimination policies."
II. The Doctrinal Alternatives
Reading these recent decisions simply as protective of anti-gay
expression, however, would be to ignore the overlay of First
Amendment doctrine that the Supreme Court has developed and
relied upon to decide each specific dispute. This doctrinal framework
for the regulation of expression provides an array of rules and
precedents for examining what expression the government may
regulate, where the government may regulate, whose expression the
government may regulate, as well as how and when the government
32. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
33. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
34. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
35. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006). While
unanimous, only eight Justices joined the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in Rumsfeld
because Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.
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may regulate such expression. Many of these judicial doctrines follow
a general pattern of considering both the strength of the
government's interests and the tailoring of the government's means to
its interests. While the rule of content and viewpoint neutrality
generally applies across free speech doctrines, some specific doctrines
independently prohibit governmental regulations that discriminate
based on viewpoint or relate to the suppression of ideas. The various
First Amendment doctrines differ in important aspects, nonetheless,
particularly regarding the burden of justification they place on the
government, as a brief review reveals.
Regarding what expression the government may regulate, the
general rule is that the regulation must be viewpoint neutral and also
content neutral, with specific exceptions for certain content such as
illegal advocacy,' fighting words," obscenity," defamation,3 9 and
communicative conduct." Regarding where the government may
regulate expression, the Court has developed its public forum
doctrine, which distinguishes between what it now calls the traditional
public forum, the designated public forum, and the limited public
forum.4' The Court also has developed specific rules pertaining to
who may speak in particular contexts, such as government
employees,4 2 public school students,43 military personnel," and prison
inmates. Regarding when government may regulate speech, the
Court has developed its prior restraint doctrine, generally prohibiting
a prior restraint of expression unless the exercise of discretion is
guided by narrow, objective, and definite standards.46 Regarding how
government may regulate speech, the Court takes into consideration
the type and extent of infringement, including for example a criminal
prohibition, a civil penalty, a compulsory mandate, or a condition on
a benefit or subsidy. The Court generally prohibits the government
36. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
38. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
39. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
41. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
42. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
46. Compare Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) with Shuttlesworth
v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
[Vol. 38:3638 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
from compelling expression and from imposing regulations that are
too vague47 or overbroad.' The Court sometimes applies a time,
place, and manner doctrine, allowing a reasonable content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulation if justified by a significant
government interest and if ample alternative channels of
49communication are left open.
In addition to the right of expression, the First Amendment also
protects the rights of free exercise of religion,' freedom from
establishment of religion," press, assembly, and petition. Each of
these rights has produced a series of doctrinal rules. Making matters
even more complex, the Court has extrapolated a freedom of
association from the enumerated protections listed in the text of the
First Amendment, thereby providing special judicial protection when
association is either intimate or expressive.5
The challenge in predicting and analyzing an outcome in any
particular First Amendment dispute is that a typical dispute may
involve more than one, if not many, of the doctrines for considering
what, where, who, when, and how the government may regulate
expression. This means the Court frequently may choose from
among these various doctrines to frame and structure its analysis.
Because some of these doctrines are more deferential to the
government, while other doctrines are more suspicious of the
government and thus subject it to a higher burden of justification, the
selection of a doctrine to frame the dispute likely influences the
Court's analysis and also tends to signal the likely result.
The Martinez case provides a textbook example. The Court
could have focused on whether the nondiscrimination policy of
Hastings was content based or viewpoint based. It could have
focused on the nature of the public forum created by Hastings. It
could have focused on the rights of student speakers in public
university settings or on the public university's conditioning of the
benefit of student group recognition. It could have focused on its
cases prohibiting compelled speech or compelled association. Or it
47. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
48. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Emphraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
49. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
50. Compare Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) with Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
51. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) with Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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could have focused on either of the religion clauses, free exercise or
freedom from establishment. Given the options available for framing
the analysis, a pertinent question arises about whether the Court has
been consistent in selecting which doctrine will frame its decision.
Considering these questions requires a close examination of the
Court's analysis in Martinez.
III. The Decision
Justice Ginsburg began by emphasizing the facts as established in
the record, acknowledging the Hastings policy of categorical
nondiscrimination as written but emphasizing the Hastings practice of
requiring Registered Student Organizations ("RSOs") to allow all-
comers to participate. Justice Ginsburg then strictly held CLS to its
factual stipulation that Hastings interpreted its policy to require any
student organization to allow all comers regardless of status or belief.
She cited to excerpts from the record where CLS acknowledged that
Hastings applied an all-comers policy.53 She cited to local District
Court rules that treat stipulated facts as "undisputed," to Supreme
Court precedents that treat stipulated facts as "established,"54 and to
leading treatises describing them as "binding and conclusive" and
"formal concessions."" On this issue, Justice Ginsburg criticized both
the dissent for "rac[ing] away from the facts to which CLS stipulated"
and CLS for its "unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and
shift its target to Hastings' policy as written.",6
Justice Ginsburg then framed the case as involving a "limited
public forum," which is established when a governmental entity opens
its property for limited use by certain groups or certain subjects."
Under existing doctrine, the government's restrictions on the use of
such a forum must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral." Justice
Ginsburg next rejected the CLS argument that the case should be
decided under the closer scrutiny required when government restricts
associational freedom. She described the speech and expressive
association rights as "closely linked" and "intertwined" and then
concluded it would be "anomalous" for a restriction to survive speech
53. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2982 n.5.
54. Id. at 2982 n.6 and 2983.
55. Id. at 2983.
56. Id. at 2983-84.
57. Id. at 2984.
58. Id.
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review but not expressive association review.59 She also argued that
strict scrutiny would require invalidation based on the very
characteristic that the Court uses to define a limited public forum.6
She explained that she chose speech forum analysis rather than
expressive association analysis because the association cases involved
the compelled inclusion of unwanted members, whereas here CLS
sought a state subsidy and therefore faced "only indirect pressure"
rather than compulsion.'
Justice Ginsburg then compared the three prior cases in which
the Supreme Court confronted conflicts between public universities
and student groups seeking recognition and benefits: Healy v. James,
Widmar v. Vincent, and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.62 She distinguished Healy on the basis that the
university had banned Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS")
because it found the group's views to be abhorrent." She similarly
distinguished Widmar and Rosenberger because those public
universities engaged in viewpoint discrimination by singling out
religious organizations for disfavored treatment.64 Thus Justice
Ginsburg effectively distinguished the other student recognition cases
as involving intentional viewpoint discrimination, which she found
absent in the Hastings record.
Justice Ginsburg then applied the limited public forum test,
which allows restrictions of expression so long as they are viewpoint
neutral and reasonable in relation to the purpose served by the
forum." She emphasized that the circumstances here involved an
educational context, and then she rejected deferring to the
university's view of the constitutionality of its actions but insisted on
giving "decent respect" to the university's decisions about sound
educational policies including its student group policy."6 Justice
59. Id. at 2985.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2986.
62. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981);
Rosenberger v. Regents of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
63. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2987.
64. Id. at 2987-88.
65. Id. at 2988.
66. Id. at 2988-89. Underscoring how context matters, Justice Ginsburg specifically
endorsed the view that First Amendment rights "must be analyzed in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Id. at 2988 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981)). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals quickly cited this passage
from Martinez in rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge brought by a former
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Ginsburg considered the four purposes Hastings offered in defense of
its all-comers policy. In essence, Hastings argued that the policy
ensures equal opportunities to all students, avoids involving the
school in policing motives and beliefs, encourages tolerance and
learning, and avoids subsidizing unlawful discrimination.' Justice
Ginsburg concluded that these justifications were "surely
reasonable."" Bolstering her finding of reasonableness, she
underscored the "substantial alternative channels" of communication
left open to CLS, including access to facilities, chalk and bulletin
boards, and electronic media,9 and she squarely rejected any
hypothetical concern about saboteurs facilitating hostile takeovers of
student groups.o She then described the all-comers policy as
"textbook viewpoint neutral" and therefore constitutional even if it
had a differential impact on groups wishing to exclude members."
Finally, she rejected the suggestion that the Free Exercise Clause
requires an exemption from nondiscrimination policies for religious
groups, citing the holding of Employment Division v. Smith which
allows enforcement of neutral laws of general applicability that
incidentally burden religious practice.72
The two concurrences extrapolated on two particular points.
Justice John Paul Stevens took on the task of replying to the dissent's
assertion that the categorical nondiscrimination policy as written
would be "plainly" unconstitutional, 73 which Justice Ginsburg had
refused to entertain.74 Justice Stevens argued that the
nondiscrimination policy merely refused to support discrimination,
was content and viewpoint neutral, regulated only conduct rather
than expression or belief, and was designed to promote religious
freedom. He insisted there was "no evidence" that the policy was
designed to target religious individuals or groups or to suppress or
employee of the Texas Education Agency ("TEA") who was terminated for publicizing an
event critical of teaching creationism because doing so violated the TEA's neutrality
policy that prohibited staff from taking positions on curriculum issues. Comer v. Scott,
610 F.3d 929, 934 (5th Cir. 2010).
67. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989-91.
68. Id. at 2991.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2992.
71. Id. at 2994.
72. Id. at 2993 n. 24 and 2995 n. 27.
73. Id. at 2995.
74. Id. at 2984 n. 10.
642 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:3
distort their views." He emphasized that disparate impact alone does
not constitute viewpoint discrimination, nor does it provide a
sufficient reason to be skeptical about the policy.6 He defended the
categorical policy as a "reasonable choice" to safeguard students from
invidious discrimination and to advance pedagogical objectives.
Notably, however, he distanced himself from the wisdom of the
categorical approach.
Justice Anthony Kennedy added a separate concurrence to
"support the analysis" provided by Justice Ginsburg, which is to say
that he separately defended his Martinez vote by distinguishing it
from his opinion for the majority in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia, which invalidated a university's
refusal to subsidize religious speech by a student group.' Justice
Kennedy suggested that a limited forum could exclude speakers
based on content but not based on hostility to views or beliefs. But
he nonetheless emphasized that the Hastings policy was not content
based in "its formulation or evident purpose."" He left open the
possibility of considering actual disparate impact on groups whose
exclusion of members is "essential to their message," but he
emphasized that exclusion here would undermine the pedagogical
purpose for having the limited forum,' which he generally described
as facilitating respectful, cooperative, and professional interactions
among students in a free, open, and vibrant dialogue in which
students learn from and teach one another." Justice Kennedy
emphasized that more facts would be required to show that the intent,
purpose, design, use or effect of this policy was to stifle the group's
viewpoint.'
Justice Alito's opinion for the four dissenting Justices resembled
a functional analysis typically associated with more liberal holdings.
75. Id. at 2996 (Stevens, J. concurring).
76. Id. at 2996-97.
77. Id. at 2997.
78. Id. at 2997 (noting the categorical approach "may or may not be the wisest
choice" and arguing that, "even if ill-advised," it is designed to prevent religious
discrimination).
79. Id. at 3000 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Rosenberger v. Regents of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
81. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2998 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 2999.
83. Id. at 2999-3000.
84. Id. at 3000.
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His description of the factual background highlighted particular facts
among the sequence of events in support of his argument that
Hastings actually applied three different incarnations of its
nondiscrimination policy: first, the written categorical
nondiscrimination policy, second, the all-comers policy described by
the dean in her deposition, and third, the some-comers policy, which
allowed some conduct requirements for group membership.5 He
emphasized that the Joint Stipulation of Facts did not specify whether
the all-comers policy existed when the school denied recognition to
CLS." Justice Alito suggested that the denial of recognition had a
harmful effect on CLS as evidenced by their loss of priority access to
facilities, their difficulty in reserving campus space for an "advice
table" and for a guest speaker, and the small size of their membership
the following school year.8 With regard to the argument that
Hastings merely declined to fund CLS activities, he replied that much
of what CLS sought would have been "virtually cost free" and that,
for university students, "the campus is their world" much like a town
square outside of campus." He complained that the majority refused
to follow Healy v. James," and argued that distinguishing Healy could
be based only on "the identity of the student group."" Here he
dropped one of his primary arguments in a footnote, where he
asserted that the denial of recognition under the Nondiscrimination
Policy was because of the viewpoint CLS sought to express through
its membership requirements.9
Justice Alito then conceded that he was "content" to address the
constitutionality under the limited public forum line of cases.'
Focusing first on the Nondiscrimination Policy, he trained on the
viewpoint neutrality requirement of the limited public forum cases
and argued that those cases treat religion as a viewpoint and
therefore that enforcing nondiscrimination based on religion and
85. Id. at 3001-04 (Alito, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 3005.
87. Id. at 3006.
8& Id. at 3007.
89. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (invalidating the university's refusal to
recognize SDS based on disagreement with the group's philosophy).
90. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3008 (Alito, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 3009 n.2. Justice Alito treats the exclusion as expression, which is somewhat
different than his subsequent quotation from Dale that allowing exclusion only where
admission would significantly affect the group's ability to advocate its viewpoint. Id. at
3012.
92. Id. at 3009.
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sexual orientation is itself viewpoint discrimination.' Specifically
with regard to religion, he asserted, without any citation, that
Hastings required only religious groups to admit students who did not
share their views. He reasoned that religious groups are different
than secular groups because religion is uniquely relevant to their
expression.94 Specifically with regard to sexual orientation, he noted
that CLS expresses a particular viewpoint on sexual morality and
conduct.95
Turning to the all-comers policy, Justice Alito argued that it was
neither reasonable nor viewpoint neutral." He endorsed the same
governmental goal of promoting diversity of viewpoints which was
emphasized by Justice Kennedy, noted that Hastings's student group
program replicated the outside world's broad array of organizations,
and argued that the First Amendment prohibits the government from
requiring religious organizations to include unwanted members
whether inside or outside the university campus.' After rejecting
each of the justifications offered by Hastings, Justice Alito
interpreted the purpose of the Hastings program quite literally,
emphasizing that Hastings sought to promote a diversity of
viewpoints among registered student organizations, not within such
organizations.98
The details of the opinions reveal the different lenses through
which the Justices viewed this dispute. Where Justice Ginsburg and
the majority saw textbook neutrality, Justice Alito and the dissenters
saw obvious pretext. What factors might explain this disagreement
and justify the decision? The first candidates include time, place, and
money.
IV. Time, Place, and Money
While it may seem self-evident, it bears noting that Martinez
clearly reflects this moment in time regarding society's consideration
of gay rights. The Martinez decision might have been perceived to be
especially ground breaking if Romer v. Evans" and Lawrence v.
93. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3010.
94. Id. at 3012.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 3013.
97. Id. at 3013-14.
98. Id. at 3016.
99. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Texas" had not already been decided. Justice Kennedy's decision on
behalf of the majority in Romer marked the first time the Supreme
Court applied the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate
discrimination against gays as a group. The Court reasoned that
Colorado's voter-approved constitutional amendment prohibiting the
state or local governments from protecting gays from discrimination
was "born of animosity" and had no rational relation to any
legitimate governmental interest.' In Lawrence, the other major gay
rights decision, Justice Kennedy again wrote the majority opinion for
six justices and this time invalidated Texas's criminalization of same-
sex sodomy based on Substantive Due Process, reasoning that gays
"are entitled to respect for their private lives" and concluding again
that the state's law furthered no legitimate state interest." Neither of
these decisions grappled with whether gays should be recognized as a
suspect class or whether they should enjoy any particular
fundamental right. Both decisions were unusual in holding that each
state's targeting of gays failed to advance any legitimate government
interest sufficient to pass the Court's lowest level of scrutiny:
rationality review. Moreover, the Court's language of respect and
protection reflected a sea change in its treatment of gays. As Justice
Kennedy emphasized, contemporary legal developments indicated an
"emerging awareness" that liberty protects private decisions
pertaining to sexuality. Specifically, both Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Lawrence noted that targeting the conduct of gays is tantamount to
targeting gays as a class of persons.103
The important point is that, at this particular moment in the
nation's history, the Court now treats gays as a class to be deserving
of ordinary constitutional protection. This constitutional inclusion of
gays remains remarkable considering the Court's perfunctory
100. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
101. Romer, 517 U.S. 620.
102. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor concurred separately to
join the court in overruling the Texas statute based instead on the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 579.
103. Id. at 575 ("[Wjhen homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination."); id. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[W]hile it is true that the law
applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely
correlated with being homosexual.").
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exclusion of gays from constitutional protection in Bowers v.
Hardwick less than twenty-five years ago.
Writing for the majority in Martinez, Justice Ginsburg quoted
both Justice Kennedy's and Justice O'Connor's statements in
Lawrence as support for her direct rejection of CLS's attempt to
distinguish between discriminating against gays based on their status
(which CLS denied doing) and merely excluding gays based on
conduct and/or belief (which CLS defended).'05 Justice Ginsburg
addressed this key point of her analysis within a section of her
opinion responding to the justification proffered by Hastings that its
all-comers policy helped the school avoid inquiring into motive and
belief. Justice Ginsburg simply characterized the task of determining
motive and belief as "daunting," raised questions about hypothetical
scenarios, cited to Lawrence for the rejection of a distinction between
status and conduct, and then moved on."
In addition to the importance of this moment in time regarding
gay rights, the Martinez decision depends heavily on the place of the
dispute. Early in the doctrinal analysis of her opinion for the
majority, Justice Ginsburg selected the limited public forum line of
cases from the Court's speech cases to frame the decision, rather than
using the expressive-association framing. Justice Ginsburg explained
that the expressive-association right is closely linked to, and
effectively derives from, speech rights, both generally and in this
particular dispute.'" She also argued that applying the strict scrutiny
used for expressive association would invalidate the defining
characteristic of limited public forums, namely that they are limited to
104. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting any Substantive Due Process
right to engage in same-sex sexual relations and upholding Georgia's sodomy law).
Although the Court's rejection of the liberty claim in Bowers v. Hardwick was perfunctory
in the sense of appearing superficial and mechanical, I do not mean to imply that the
opinions were lacking in passion. Indeed, the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger, characterizing Michael Hardwick's liberty claim as "at best, facetious" might be
better characterized as expressing moral outrage at the audacity of even suggesting that
gays might be protected by Substantive Due Process. Id. at 194.
105. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990.
106. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990. Justice Ginsburg also cited a comparative quotation
from Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic. 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) ("[A] tax on
wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews."). She also cited the Brief submitted by Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae at 7-20. Martinez, 130 S.
Ct. at 2990 (citing Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1371)).
107. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2985.
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certain groups of speakers.'"' This aspect of Justice Ginsburg's
analysis is important because the practical effect was to apply more
lenient scrutiny rather than closer scrutiny to decide the case.
The third factor that weighs heavily in explaining Martinez is the
issue of subsidy. Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion noted that CLS
was seeking a state subsidy when it requested RSO status with
accompanying benefits. According to Justice Ginsburg, the Hastings
nondiscrimination policy was "dangling the carrot of subsidy, not
wielding the stick of prohibition. "'w Emphasizing the indirect
pressure resulting from a denial of subsidy in Martinez (as compared
to the direct compulsion to include unwanted members in both
Hurley and Dale) provided the basis for Justice Ginsburg to
distinguish these otherwise similar precedents. The denial of a
subsidy also affected her understanding of the appropriate baseline,
as Justice Ginsburg emphasized in her repeated characterization of
CLS as seeking "not parity with other organizations, but a
preferential exemption from Hastings' policy.""o
Justice Ginsburg's analysis thus situated Martinez: (1) as
consistent with the respectful treatment of gays in both Romer and
Lawrence: (2) as involving only a limited public forum; and (3) as
involving only indirect pressure not to discriminate against gays
rather than compulsion to include them as in Hurley and Dale. This
third factor regarding subsidizing or conditioning benefits raises the
perpetually troubling issue of the Court's inconsistency about when
such governmental conditions are unconstitutional.
V. Selectivity and the Sleeper Comparison
One of the problems with a constitutional decision involving
strings attached to government benefits is the Court's overall
inconsistency in how it considers this factor. The general problem is
that the Court may choose between two logical but opposing
doctrines to frame such cases. The first doctrine is the greater power
includes the lesser power."' In this case, because Hastings had the
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2986.
110. Id. at 2978. Justice Ginsburg later described Hastings as denying CLS recognition
not to silence the organization's viewpoint "but because CLS, insisting on preferential
treatment, declined to comply with the open-access policy applicable to all RSOs." Id. at
2987 n.15.
111. E.g., see Rust, 500 U.S. at 196-198 (applying the greater power includes lesser
power logic: because Congress has the greater power not to fund family planning at all, it
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greater power not to provide student recognition at all, it arguably
had the lesser power to condition student recognition on
nondiscrimination. This doctrine could be used to justify the Hastings
policy, as the majority decided. On the other hand, the
unconstitutional condition doctrine posits that the government may
not do indirectly (through conditions on benefits) what it may not do
directly (through compulsion)."2 This doctrine could be used to
invalidate the Hastings policy, as the dissent urged. While neither
side invoked either of these doctrines expressly, the majority
effectively applied the logic of the greater power includes the lesser
while the dissent applied the logic of an unconstitutional condition. 3
Much ink has been spilled generally about the inconsistent
application of these doctrines and specifically regarding under what
circumstances conditioning a benefit comprises a constitutional
infringement. 4 The unconstitutional condition doctrine has been
addressed in some major progressive decisions, such as Speiser v.
Randall,"' and Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,"' as well as
has the lesser power to insist that federal family planning funds not be spent to support
abortion). Also, while the criminalization of sodomy was constitutional, this logic was
followed to oppose rights for gays, see, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("If it is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and
protection to those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct.").
112. E.g., see Rust, 500 U.S. at 207 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (applying the
unconstitutional conditions logic: because Congress may not directly suppress content or
viewpoint, it may not indirectly suppress content or viewpoint by imposing conditions on
family planning funds).
113. While the Supreme Court majority did not use the language of the
unconstitutional condition doctrine, the doctrine was expressly invoked by the majority
panel decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidating a similar
nondiscrimination policy applied to deny recognition of the Christian Legal Society at
Southern Illinois University School of Law. Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d
853, 864 (2006) ("[S]IU may not do indirectly what it is constitutionally prohibited from
doing directly."). The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the district court's reliance on
the reasoning that the greater power to deny the benefit includes the lesser to condition
the benefit. Id. at 867 (rejecting the district court's belief "that CLS was not being forced
to include anyone, but was simply being told that if it desires the benefits of recognized
student organization status, it must abide by SIU's antidiscrimination policy").
114. Classic articles on this topic include, for example, Kathleen Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Forward: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech,
and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
115. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a loyalty oath as a condition
of receiving a property tax exemption for veterans).
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conservative decisions, such as Rust v. Sullivan."' While the doctrine
has been defended by more liberal scholars and criticized by more
conservative scholars, the doctrine does not inherently favor liberal
causes, nor is it favored only by liberal justices, as conservative
justices have invoked the logic of the doctrine in cases other than
Martinez. One such case factually similar to the dispute between CLS
and Hastings was Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of
Virginia.118
Rosenberger involved a university's student funding program
similarly designed to encourage diversity among student speakers.
There Justice Kennedy writing for the majority invalidated the
University's refusal to fund religious publications as content-based
and viewpoint-based discrimination."' It should have come as no
surprise that Justice Kennedy concurred separately in Martinez to
distinguish Rosenberger. Unlike the Rosenberger policy which
expressly prohibited funding for religious publications, Justice
Kennedy believed the Hastings policy was not shown to be content-
based "either in its formulation or evident purpose,"120 nor was it
shown that the "purpose or effect of the policy was to stifle speech or
make it ineffective." 121 In Justice Kennedy's view, because there was
no evidence of facial or intentional discrimination based on either
content or viewpoint, the Hastings policy was constitutional.122 Justice
Kennedy thus treated the Hastings policy as, at most, involving
merely incidental effect or disparate impact, and thus he applied a
lower level of scrutiny.
While emphasizing that funding played "a very small role" in
Martinez, the dissenting Justices nonetheless insisted that the denial
116. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velasquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (invalidating a restriction
prohibiting federally funded legal services lawyers from challenging welfare reform).
117. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding a restriction prohibiting federally
funded medical providers from counseling a patient about abortion).
118. Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995).
119. Id.
120. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2999 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 3000.
122. Id. at 2999-3000. Justice Kennedy several times noted that it would have been a
different case if it had been shown that the Hastings policy was facially or intentionally
content based or viewpoint based or was intentionally designed to stifle speech or make it
ineffective. Interestingly, however, Justice Kennedy went to some length to explain that
allowing students groups to require what he called "loyalty oaths" would undermine the
purpose and value of a law school's limited forum designed to facilitate "rational,"
"respectful," "professional," "free," and "open" discussion and learning. Id.
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of recognition and denial of equal access to facilities and customary
media burdened the constitutional rights of CLS and constituted
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.'23 Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice Alito's opinion. This
same conservative line-up, with the addition of Justice Kennedy,
followed the opposite reasoning in a recent case with opposite
political connotations, Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association.'24
Ysursa involved a free speech challenge brought by labor unions. The
conservative majority, joined in part by Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Stephen Breyer, applied only rational basis review and upheld
Idaho's stripping of a government employee's ability to direct payroll
deductions for political activities.125  Rather than focusing on the
unconstitutionality of the condition as in the Martinez dissent, the
conservative Justices in Ysursa applied the logic of the greater power
includes the lesser, emphasizing that "the parties agree that the State
is not constitutionally obligated to provide payroll deductions at all"
and that "Idaho is under no obligation to aid the unions in their
political activities."126  The conservative majority reasoned that the
State's decision not to aid the unions is not an infringement of the
unions' speech and that the unions remain free to engage in speech
but have no right to enlist the State to support their speech.2 7
Because the State was free not to support the unions' speech, the
majority rejected strict scrutiny and applied only rational basis
review.'2 The Court then found that the State's stripping of the
ability to direct payroll deductions was justified by the State's interest
"in avoiding the reality or appearance of government favoritism or
entanglement with partisan politics."129
123. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3007-08 (Alito, J., dissenting).
124. Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009) (applied rational basis
review and upheld state's stripping of right to direct payroll deductions from local
government employees).
125. Id. at 1098-99.
126. Id. at 1098.
127. Id. at 1098 n.10 ("While publicly administered payroll deductions for political
purposes can enhance the unions' exercise of First Amendment rights, a State is under no
obligation to aid a union in its political activities. And a State's decision not to do so is not
an abridgement of the unions' speech; it is free to engage in such speech as it sees fit. It is
simply are barred from enlisting the State in support of that endeavor."). Not only was the
denial of payroll deductions not an infringement of speech, but it also was not a
suppression of speech. Id. at 1099 ("Idaho does not suppress political speech but simply
declines to promote it through public employer checkoffs for political activities.").
128. Id. at 1098.
129. Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1098.
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One possible distinction between the more conservative Justices'
reasoning in Ysursa and their Martinez dissent might involve the
degree of government funding. In other words, the more
conservative Justices might have believed that more state funding was
involved in Idaho's administration of payroll deductions than in
Hastings's administration of student groups. However, such a
distinction would be inapposite because Ysursa involved the state's
ban as applied to local government employers, which received no
subsidy from the state in the administration of local payroll
deductions.' Although no state subsidy was provided to local
government employers, the conservative majority nonetheless
reasoned that local government entities are subordinate
governmental subdivisions subject to state regulation and that the
state's interest in separating government from partisan politics
applied to all public employees at whatever level of government."'
Both Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred with upholding the
ban based solely on the technical point that local governments are
creatures of the state and therefore are subject to state regulation.132
But Justice Stevens issued a vigorous dissent,"' which followed a path
of reasoning different from that which he endorsed in Martinez, much
like the flip-flop by the conservative majority in Ysursa (excepting
Justice Kennedy). Justice Stevens began with a baseline point,
arguing that payroll deductions are routinely remitted in both the
public and private sectors. He then argued that Idaho intended to
make it more difficult for unions to finance their political speech and
130. Id. at 1097. The District Court in Ysursa upheld the State's refusal to subsidize
payroll deductions at the state level but invalidated the state ban on payroll deductions as
applied to local government employers because the State had failed to identify any subsidy
it provided to such local government employers. Id. at 1097 (citing Pocatello Edu. Ass'n v.
Heideman, 2005 WL 3241745 *2 (D. Idaho, Nov. 23 2005)). The State appealed the
invalidation of the law as applied to local government employers and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that no state subsidy was involved at the
local government level. Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1097 (citing 504 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.
2007)).
131. Id. at 1100.
132. Id. at 1101-02.
133. Id. at 1108-09 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter also dissented arguing that
the circumstances suggest viewpoint discrimination but, because the union did not appeal
the ban on payroll deductions as applied to the state, the Court could not reach the real
"elephant in the room" and thus should have dismissed certiorari as improvidently
granted. Id. Because Justice Souter had resigned from the Court, he did not participate in
deciding the Martinez dispute between CLS and Hastings.
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therefore he would have invalidated the law in all its applications.13
Justice Stevens gleaned discriminatory intent from the statutory
context as well as from the statute's substantial over and under
inclusiveness. He emphasized that the ban on payroll deductions was
part of a group of statutory provisions that were directed at union
fundraising.135 He noted that the ban on payroll deductions was over-
inclusive in reaching private employers, although the State conceded
that the application of the provision to private employers was
unconstitutional.1' He also argued that the statute was under-
inclusive in failing to ban payroll deductions for charitable purposes,
which he argued "often present a similar risk of creating an
appearance of political involvement."' Justice Stevens also noted his
disagreement with the majority's assertion that the question of state
funding was immaterial because local governments are creatures of
the state.38 He urged instead that the Court should have examined
whether the State was acting in its capacity as regulator or
proprietor.
In Ysursa, Justice Stevens looked beyond the face of the payroll
deduction, which applied to all political deductions, and gleaned from
the context a governmental intent to discriminate against the political
expression of unions. Contrast this with his concurring opinion in
Martinez, in which he was satisfied that Hastings's nondiscrimination
policy, as written, was content and viewpoint neutral'" and that there
was "no evidence that the policy was adopted because of any reason
related to the particular views that religious individuals or groups
might have, much less because of a desire to suppress or distort those
views." 141  Although he acknowledged in Martinez that disparate
impact on religious groups might occur, he found no evidence or
reason to be skeptical of the nondiscrimination policy. He instead
cited a greater danger, concluding: "Other groups may exclude or
mistreat Jews, blacks, and women-or those who do not share their
contempt for Jews, blacks, and women. A free society must tolerate
134. Ysursa 129 S. Ct. at 1104-)5 (Stevens J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1105.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1106.
138. Id. at 1107.
139. Id. at 1107. For an extended discussion of the importance of the government's
role, see Davis & Rosenberg, supra note 4.
140. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2996 (Stevens, J., concurring).
141. Id.
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such groups. It need not subsidize them, give them its official
imprimatur, or grant them equal access to law school facilities."'42
Comparing Martinez with Ysursa, it appears that the
conservative group of four, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito, as well as the more liberal Justice
Stevens, contradicted their own prior reasoning. Important factual
distinctions typically can be used to save justices from a charge of
inconsistency. But the pattern of inconsistency is not limited to the
issue of subsidy, as revealed by a comparison of the sex discrimination
and sexual orientation discrimination cases within the context of
expressive association.
VI. The Sex Discrimination Trilogy
Why didn't the Court treat the challenge brought by CLS in the
same doctrinal manner as the challenges brought by the Jaycees'43 and
the Rotary Club,1" especially considering that the Court reached
similar results in siding with the government's imposition of
nondiscrimination in membership for these organizations? In other
words, why did the Court insist on applying the more lenient scrutiny
used for limited public forum cases rather than the higher scrutiny
used for burdens on expressive association?
Similar to Martinez, the Court's analysis of the right of
association in Roberts v. United States Jaycees examined an
amendment to a state's nondiscrimination law and addressed most of
the same constitutional concerns. In 1973 Minnesota's state
legislature amended its state statute to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of sex in public accommodations.145  The next year, the
Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting
women, in apparent defiance of the national organization's
prohibition on full membership of women.'" The national
organization imposed various sanctions on the members of these
chapters, including denying their eligibility for state or national
positions, awards, or voting privileges at conventions. When the
national organization threatened to revoke the local charters in 1978,
142. Id. at 2998.
143. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
144. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
145. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624.
146. Id. at 614.
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protracted litigation began which culminated in the Supreme Court's
decision in 1984 upholding the state's nondiscrimination laws.147
The Jaycees Court clarified that the freedom of association
encompasses a right to intimate association that "receives protection
as a fundamental element of personal liberty" and also a right to
expressive association that is "an indispensable means" for "engaging
in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion. "'4 After rejecting the intimate association claim as
inapplicable, the Court turned to the Jaycees' claim that the First
Amendment implicitly protects its expressive association.149 The
Court then separated claims where the government imposes penalties
or withholds benefits because it disfavors the group from claims
where the government interferes with the internal organization or
affairs of a group.5 o In separating these two types of violations, the
Court in effect separated the equality and the liberty interests at
stake. The Court then explained that there "could be no clearer
example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an
association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members
it does not desire." 51 In other words, the Court did not treat the
state's nondiscrimination law as interfering with the Jaycees' equality
interest but instead treated it as interfering with their liberty interest.
With regard to the level of scrutiny, the Court noted that the
right of expressive association is not absolute, but that any
interference might be justified by regulations serving a compelling
government interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms.5 2 In a series of arguments that easily could
have been applied by analogy in Martinez, the Jaycees majority held
that the state has a "compelling interest" in eradicating discrimination
against women and "removing the barriers to economic advancement
and political and social integration that have historically plagued
147. Id. at 614-17 (describing various proceedings and decisions of the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights and the federal court, as well as a question certified to the
state supreme court).
148. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
149. Id. at 622.
150. Id. at 622-23. The Court also noted a third type of claim where government is
requiring disclosure of membership in a group seeking anonymity.
151. Id. at 623.
152. Id.
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certain disadvantaged groups, including women."' 3  The Court
effectively accepted protection of equality as a justification for an
infringement of liberty, finding that equality concerns about using
"archaic and overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and
capacities of the sexes" that "often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities" are "strongly implicated" with respect to gender
discrimination in public accommodations.54
Regarding the impairment of the group's message, the Jaycees
decision directly addressed the issue of deference to the group in
determining the group's message and the burden on the group. The
Court did not defer to the Jaycees, which had resisted allowing
women to participate as full voting members over the course of the
six-year litigation battle. Instead, the Court repeatedly stated that
there was no basis for concluding that including women as full
members would "impede," "impair," or "change" the group's
message."' Absent a "more substantial" showing of impairment, the
Court simply refused to engage in "sexual stereotyping.""' The Court
further rejected concern about any incidental effect on the Jaycees'
expression, and thus found the law to be sufficiently tailored, in part
based on the Court's rather broad assertion that "invidious
discrimination" in publicly available benefits is not entitled to any
constitutional protection.
The Jaycees decision, while framed as within the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of expressive association,
apparently enforced equality over liberty. The Jaycees Court first
looked to whether the government violated equality norms by
disfavoring the group and whether it violated liberty norms by
interfering with the group's activities. The Court apparently found no
unequal treatment by the government, as it did not analyze that type
of violation. Instead, the Court examined the government's
interference with the group's liberty. Applying the heightened
scrutiny associated with expressive association, the Court nonetheless
found that the government's actions were justified because they
served to protect the equality of women, which in effect trumped the
Jaycees' liberty. In other words, the government did not treat the
153. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624, 626.
154. Id. at 625.
155. Id. at 627.
156. Id. at 628.
157. Id.
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Jaycees unequally. It infringed their liberty so as to protect the
equality of women, a historically disadvantaged group. Enforcing or
protecting equality for women was a sufficient reason for interfering
with the Jaycees' liberty.
The Rotary Club Court engaged in a more cursory examination
of the nondiscrimination law's tailoring. There the Court similarly
found no evidence of significant infringement of the Rotary Club's
service activities caused by California's prohibition of excluding
women, and also similarly found California's nondiscrimination
statute to be facially neutral with regard to the organization's
viewpoint.5  With regard to any incidental effects on the Rotary's
Club's expressive association, the Court simply repeated that such
"slight infringement" is justified because the law "plainly serves" the
state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women."' The Court gave no further consideration to whether this
interest could be served by means significantly less restrictive than
compelling the inclusion of women as full members.
Both the Jaycees and Rotary Club decisions were issued without
any dissenting opinion. In the Jaycees decision, Justice O'Connor
wrote a thoughtful concurring opinion, distinguishing between
primarily commercial and primarily expressive organizations,'6o while
then-Justice William Rehnquist merely concurred in the judgment
without an opinion.1"' Following Justice Rehnquist's example, Justice
Scalia similarly concurred in the Rotary Club judgment without an
161opinion.16
A third less well-known decision, New York State Club
Association v. City of New York, 63 grappled directly with the
intersection between identity and expression. In this decision, again
158. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
159. Id. at 549.
160. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that she found
the Court's analysis to be "overprotective" of predominantly commercial associational
activities which are undeserving of constitutional protection but also "underprotective" of
truly expressive associational activities). Notably, Justice O'Connor raised the question
that would soon confront the Court in the Hurley and Dale decisions when she queried
whether the Court's analysis would "be different if, for example, the Jaycees membership
had a steady history of opposing public issues thought (by the Court) to be favored by
women?" Id. at 633.
161. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harry
Blackmun took no part in the decision. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
162. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 550. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor took no part in
the decision. Id.
163. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
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without a dissenting opinion,"' the Supreme Court for the third time
considered whether a law prohibiting sex discrimination in public
accommodations infringed the right of organizations to expressive
association. The City Council of New York amended its Human
Rights Law in 1984 to apply to organizations with more than four
hundred members but exempted those incorporated under laws
regulating benevolent orders or religious corporations.' The City
Council expressly found that "the public interest in equal
opportunity" outweighed "the interest in private association asserted
by club members," and that the amendment would regulate private
club activities only so far as "necessary to ensure that clubs do not
automatically exclude persons ... on account of invidious
discrimination."16
The New York State Club Association immediately brought a
constitutional challenge, and the Supreme Court again sided with the
government's nondiscrimination law. Justice Byron White's majority
opinion described the city's law as preventing an association from
using "specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of
what the city considers to be more legitimate criteria for determining
membership."' Notably, however, Justice White's opinion left open
the possibility that organizations may exclude those who do not share
its views or who would reduce how effectively the organization could
164. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined,
N.Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 18-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and in which she agreed
with upholding the law because "[p]redominantly commercial organizations are not
entitled to claim a First Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the
anti-discrimination provisions triggered by the law." Id. at 20. Justice Scalia also
concurred in the judgment and concurred in part. Id. at 20-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment). Interestingly, Justice Scalia disagreed with the
majority's reasoning in the Equal Protection part of the decision because he believed the
majority had interpreted the rational basis test too leniently. Specifically, he disagreed
that it was rational to exempt benevolent orders merely because they are "unique." Id. at
20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Instead, and interestingly,
he argued: "As forgiving as the rational-basis test is, it does not go that far. There must at
least be some plausible connection between the respect in which they are unique and the
purpose of the law." Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(emphasis added). He reasoned instead that the law was rational because the clubs at
issue, "lodges and fraternal type organizations," were not likely to be venues "where men
dine with clients and conduct business." Id. at 21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
165. N. Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 6-7.
166. Id. at 6.
167. Id. at 13.
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advocate its desired viewpoints.'" Nonetheless, because the claim was
brought as a facial challenge, the Court held that the law could be
applied constitutionally to many large clubs not organized for specific
expressive purposes and that any individual association whose
expression might be impaired could bring a subsequent as-applied
challenge.'69
In this sex discrimination trilogy within the expressive association
context, the Court clearly refused to presume that the mere presence
of women would interfere with these organizations' messages. Of
course, while each of these organizations adamantly defended their
right to discriminate based on sex, none of them directly claimed, nor
was the Court willing to presume, that their messages expressed
discrimination against women or the superiority of men over women
or any other sex-based message. Would an organization overtly or
presumably expressing discriminatory messages fare any differently?
This issue emerged more directly in the controversies over excluding
gays from the Boston St. Patrick's Day parade and the Boy Scouts, as
the next section examines.
VII. The Sexual Orientation Duo
Why did the Court treat CLS differently than the Boy Scouts and
organizers of the Boston St. Patrick's Day parade? Justice Ginsburg's
answer for the majority relied on forum analysis and subsidy analysis.
She explained that Hurley involved a traditional public forum, the
streets (as compared to the limited public forum in Martinez) and that
Dale involved the compulsion of unwanted members with no opt-out
(as compared to the mere refusal to subsidize in Martinez).170
Distinguishing these two sexual orientation cases based on the
subsidy and forum factors does not suffice to explain Martinez,
considering that both of these factors were present in Rosenberger
where the Court invalidated the university's refusal to subsidize a
religious student publication in a limited public forum."' Moreover,
in Rosenberger, the Court concluded that the government singled out
168. Id.
169. Id. 14-15.
170. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
171. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (applying the limited public forum test) and 832-37
(rejecting the university's argument that it was merely exercising its discretion in allocating
scarce funds).
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the student group because of its religious point of view,172 which is
precisely what CLS and the dissenters argued Hastings had done in
Martinez.
Putting the Rosenberger comparison to the side for the time
being, the task remains to understand why Martinez upheld
application of the nondiscrimination policy whereas Hurley and Dale
invalidated application of the nondiscrimination policies. In all three
sexual orientation cases-Hurley, Dale, and Martinez-the
government actors were applying nondiscrimination laws that
prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation."' Granted, the
place where those prohibitions were applied was different, as Hurley
involved the traditional public forum of the street, Dale involved an
organization considered to be a public accommodation, and Martinez
involved a university's limited public forum. While it is possible that
the place was determinative, it seems highly unlikely given that the
extensive reasoning of each decision relied heavily on factors other
than location.17
One possible key to understanding the Court's divergent
reasoning was the Court's finding that forcing speakers to include
gays would impair their messages in Hurley and Dale, whereas the
Court found no such impairment in Martinez. So how does the
presence of a gay person impair the message of the St. Patrick's Day
parade and the Boy Scouts, but not the message of fundamentalist
Christians?
In Hurley, the Court noted that the group wanted to march in the
St. Patrick's Day parade, as they had once done, behind "a shamrock-
strewn banner with the simple inscription 'Irish American Gay,
172. Id. at 831 ("[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but
selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial
viewpoints.").
173. For a consideration of the implications of Martinez regarding nondiscrimination
based on religions, see Alan Brownstein and Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational
Freedom Claims in a Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between
Debate-Dampening and Debate-Distorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505
(2011).
174. Justice Ginsburg noted that Hurley might be read as either a speech case
involving a traditional public forum or an expressive association case. The Court recently
appeared to reject any general rule that the government may never discriminate with
regard to speech in a traditional public forum such as a street or park in Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), which held that it is constitutionally permissible
for the government to discriminate in a traditional public forum when the government
itself is speaking.
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Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston."'175 What message does the
presence of openly gay Irish people convey?'7 ' The Court stated such
a contingent would "at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish
are gay, lesbian, or bisexual," and "the presence of the organized
marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual
orientations have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as
heterosexuals."'77 Similarly, in Dale, the Court reasoned that Dale's
presence would force the Boy Scouts to send a message that it accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior, which "would
significantly burden the organization's right to oppose or disfavor
homosexual conduct."'79
Justice Stevens's dissent in Dale, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the only explanation for the
majority's holding was singling out an openly gay individual for
different First Amendment treatment by presuming that his mere
presence "communicates a message that permits his exclusion
wherever he goes."" Of course, the four dissenting Justices were
hampered in Dale because they all had joined the Court's unanimous
decision in Hurley, which rested upon a similar analysis. The Dale
dissenters resorted to factual distinctions between the cases, arguing
that Dale had not carried a banner or otherwise expressed any intent
to convey a message, as had the group in Hurley.'
While it otherwise might be tempting to distinguish Martinez as
merely denying benefits to student organizations whereas Hurley and
Dale involved compelling the inclusion of unwanted members, recall
that Rosenberger treated the denial of benefits to student
175. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570.
176. For many years my students have endured the hypothetical "A.G.A.G.A."
question: would it be constitutional for the St. Patrick's Day parade organizers to exclude
a group known as Ashamed Gays Against Gay Acceptance or A.G.A.G.A.?
177. Id. at 574. One year after Hurley, Justice Scalia went much further in stereotyping
gays in his dissent in Romer, 517 U.S. at 645-46 (Scalia, J. dissenting) ("The problem (a
problem, that is, for those who wish to retain social disapprobation of homosexuality) is
that, because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in disproportionate
numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income, and, of course, care about
homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess
political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide. Quite
understandably, they devote this political power to achieving not merely a grudging social
toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.") (citations omitted).
178. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
179. Id. at 659.
180. Id. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 694-95.
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organizations as a constitutional infringement, thus weakening the
valence of that difference as a persuasive distinction. Recall also that
both Rosenberger and Martinez were treated as limited public forum
cases. The crux of the cases seems to be whether the government
engaged in unequal treatment of the student group. According to the
majority decisions, the unequal treatment in Rosenberger was
intentional and overt, whereas it was merely an incidental effect in
Martinez. For such an incidental effect to constitute an infringement
of expressive association, the Court would have had to treat the
pressure to include gays as pressure to change the group's ideological
message. In other words, the Court would have had to conflate
identity and ideology.
VIII. The Relationship Between Identity and Ideology
How does the Court treat the relationship between identity and
ideology?'m The Court sometimes distinguishes between identity and
ideology. For example, consider the Court's equal protection
decision in James v. Valtierra.'m The Court upheld a voter initiative
that amended the California constitution to prohibit the building of
affordable housing unless approved by a majority of local voters.
Although it might seem self-evident that such a requirement would
disparately impact impoverished persons, the Court refused to treat
the law as discrimination against individuals or families based on their
impoverished status and insisted instead that the law affected the
entire class of "persons advocating low-income housing."'" The
Court then proceeded to apply only rational basis review and upheld
the disparate ideological impact. Applying the logic of James to
Martinez, one might argue that the Hastings policy similarly did not
directly target Christians or fundamentalist religious adherents, that
any disparate impact would merely affect the entire class of persons
advocating against homosexuality, and that such advocacy or ideology
does not receive any special constitutional protection.
The Supreme Court also has distinguished between identity and
ideology within the First Amendment context, for example, in the
sex-discrimination trilogy. In the Jaycees decision, the Court
182. For a provocative defense of distinctions based on ideology rather than on
identity, see Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 749 (2009).
183. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
184. Id. at 142.
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expressly held that the state's nondiscrimination law required no
change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men
and imposed no restriction on its ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies different from the Jaycees.' 5  The Court instead chastised
the Jaycees for discriminating based solely on identity, specifically for
relying on "unsupported generalizations" and "sexual stereotyping"
regarding the putative perspectives of men and women.'" Similarly,
in the New York State Club decision, the Court expressly
distinguished between discrimination based on identity and
discrimination based on ideology.'" While the Rotary Club decision
did not address the distinction explicitly, the Court noted that the
organization focused on service activities and did not even take
positions on public or political questions and, therefore, held that
requiring Rotary to admit women would not significantly affect or
infringe their expressive association.'8
Sex is generally not a hidden characteristic, and society thus has
no equivalent vocabulary for being "openly female." In the sex
185. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 627 ("[Tlhere is, however, no basis in the record for
concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's
ability to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views. The
Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and
it imposes no restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with
ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members. Moreover, the
Jaycees already invites women to share the group's views and philosophy and to
participate in much of its training and community activities. Accordingly, any claim that
admission of women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message conveyed by
the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at best.") (citations
omitted).
186. Id. at 627-28 ("In claiming that women might have a different attitude about such
issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, and foreign relations, or that the
organization's public positions would have a different effect if the group were not 'a purely
young men's association,' the Jaycees relies solely on unsupported generalizations about
the relative interests and perspectives of men and women. Although such generalizations
may or may not have a statistical basis in fact with respect to particular positions adopted
by the Jaycees, we have repeatedly condemned legal decisionmaking that relies
uncritically on such assumptions. In the absence of a showing far more substantial than
that attempted by the Jaycees, we decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that
underlies appellee's contention that, by allowing women to vote, application of the
Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of the organization's speech.") (citations
omitted).
187. N.Y. State Club, 487 U.S. at 13 ("[I]f a club seeks to exclude individuals who do
not share the views that the club's members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle
to this end. Instead, the Law merely prevents an association from using race, sex, and the
other specified characteristics as shorthand measures in place of what the city considers to
be more legitimate criteria for determining membership.").
188. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
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discrimination expressive association cases, the Court recognized that
seeing or knowing an individual's sex reveals nothing about an
individual's interests, perspectives, or abilities. Yet the Jaycees and
the Rotary Club argued, all the way to the Supreme Court, that sex
mattered. They vigorously sought to protect their right not to include
females as members of their organizations, arguing that including
women as members would alter their all-male membership and thus
alter their expressive association. But the Court disagreed. It simply
refused to treat sex as ideologically message-laden or to make any
presumptions about the likely viewpoints of women.
Compare the sex cases to Hurley and Dale, where the Court held
that the mere presence of an openly gay person sends a message that
the individual demands acceptance.1 89 Here the Court conflated an
openly gay identity with an ideological perspective. What if, instead,
being gay is merely a descriptive fact to an individual, just as being
female is a fact? What if some individuals are simultaneously gay and
also adherents of Christianity, family values, ethical norms, moral
principles, and so forth?
The Hurley and Dale courts conflated gay identity with an
ideology, which is precisely what they had refused to do with regard
to women. So why didn't the Court conflate sexual orientation
identity and ideological message in Martinez, as it did in Hurley and
Dale? Has the understanding of sexual orientation changed that
much in the fifteen years since Hurley and the ten years since Dale?
Perhaps it has. Without trying to measure the overall effect of
societal changes, a focus on changes in constitutional doctrine may
illuminate.
At this moment in time regarding the constitutional treatment of
sexual orientation, the Court now has made clear in Romer and
Lawrence that government may not rely on animosity or moral
disapproval of same-sex sexuality as a legitimate governmental
interest. The Martinez Court further underscored what the Lawrence
Court also made clear, namely that discrimination based on same-sex
conduct is tantamount to discrimination based on same-sex status or
identity.'" As a result, the loophole that CLS and the dissenting
189. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (describing the presence of the openly gay Irish
marchers as claiming "unqualified social acceptance"); Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (describing
the presence of a known gay scoutmaster as sending the message that the Boy Scouts
"accept homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior").
190. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2990 (citing to both Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
and Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lawrence).
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Justices hoped to exploit-the possibility of protection of ideological
expression left open in the sex discrimination trilogy-appears to
have been closed, albeit indirectly, by Romer and Lawrence. In
effect, the argument made by CLS and defended by Justice Alito in
dissent-that nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation is itself
discrimination against a particular viewpoint regarding sexual
moralityl 91-had been foreclosed by the logic of Lawrence especially.
Both CLS and Justice Alito's dissenting opinion in Martinez
claimed that the Hastings nondiscrimination policy constituted
viewpoint discrimination. Justice Ginsburg turned the accusation
back against CLS, however, endorsing the argument from the
Hastings brief that CLS was confusing its own viewpoint
discrimination (against nondiscrimination laws) with viewpoint
discrimination against it. Justice Ginsburg went even further in using
the conduct/expression distinction against CLS when she reasoned
that Hastings required only that CLS conform its conduct to the
nondiscrimination policy regarding access to membership but that the
group could continue to express its own discriminatory viewpoint
because the Constitution protects expression even of "the thought
that we hate."'92
In addition to the change in constitutional treatment of sexual
orientation, consider the possibility that the Court was entrenching a
broader norm with regard to how it handles incidental effects or
disparate impact claims across constitutional doctrines.
IX. The Relationship Between Liberty and Equality
Much of the work done to lay the foundation for upholding the
Hastings nondiscrimination policy occurred in a brief section in which
Justice Ginsburg argued that the expressive-association and free-
speech claims of CLS "merge." 193 Although CLS asked the Court to
examine the claims separately, the organization had argued
nonetheless that who speaks on its behalf colors what concept is
191. Justice Alito's dissenting opinion specifically characterized the Hastings
nondiscrimination policy as discrimination "on the basis of viewpoint regarding sexual
morality" and argued the CLS requirement that its members "foreswear 'unrepentant
participation in or advocacy of a sexually immoral lifestyle"' "should qualify as a conduct
requirement." Id. at 3012 (Alito, J. dissenting).
192. Id. at 2994 (majority opinion) (citing the Court' conduct-speech distinction made
in Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 60, as well as Justice Alito's dissenting quotation of Justice
Holmes' dissent regarding protecting expression of "the thought that we hate.").
193. Id. at 2985.
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conveyed.1 94 Citing this argument, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that it
would not make sense to treat the claims as discrete because the
rights are indeed "closely linked."' This is quite similar to Justice
Kennedy's decision for the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, reasoning
that equality and liberty are intertwined in important ways. *
Justice Ginsburg proceeded to cite three reasons for applying
limited public forum analysis rather than the expressive association
line of cases: (1) it would be "anomalous" for a speech restriction to
survive only to be struck down as an association violation; (2)
applying the strict scrutiny required by the expressive association line
of cases would invalidate the defining characteristic of the limited
public forum; and (3) the denial of a governmental subsidy is not
equivalent to compelling a group to include unwanted members with
no choice to opt out.'97 Justice Ginsburg offered some reassurance to
CLS in footnote 13, however, which emphasized that the limited
public forum doctrine, like the subsidy cases, prohibits viewpoint
discrimination.98
The key point is that both lines of cases prohibit viewpoint
discrimination, which is presumably why Justice Alito was "content"
to use the limited public forum line of cases as well.' 99 That both the
limited public forum and subsidy cases prohibit viewpoint
discrimination underscores the Court's concern with ensuring equal
treatment, which arguably does the heaviest lifting in many First
Amendment doctrines. Rarely does the government infringe the
liberty of all. Rather, in making its various legal classifications, the
government frequently discriminates, either intentionally or
incidentally. Therefore, the constitutional violation is frequently the
government's unequal treatment of expression.
If it is unequal governmental treatment that concerns the Court,
the Martinez decision makes more sense because it effectively aligns
the incidental effects cases in the context of expressive association
with the incidental effects cases in the context of free exercise of
religion as well as the disparate impact cases in the context of equal
protection. In other words, across these constitutional doctrines the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
197. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 3009 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Court refuses to apply higher scrutiny unless the Court is persuaded
that the government's discrimination is intentional.2
In Martinez, the Court refused to apply the higher scrutiny used
in expressive-association cases, which places the burden on the
government to show that it has a compelling interest, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means
significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.20' Instead, the
Court employed the more lenient scrutiny used in limited public
forum cases, which requires merely that any access barrier be
reasonable and viewpoint neutral.20
Similarly, in the context of free exercise, Employment Division v.
Smith requires only that the government have a rational basis for a
neutral law of general applicability that has an incidental effect on
free exercise of religion.203 The Court reserves higher scrutiny for
situations where the government has targeted religious exercise.2 04
In the doctrinal context of equal protection, the Court also
reserves higher scrutiny for cases of intentional or overt
discrimination, but uses only rational basis review for cases involving
only disparate impact.205 Justice Scalia recently emphasized this point:
"without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally applicable law
with disparate impact is not unconstitutional."2 0 He argued that this
is especially so when the class complaining of disparate impact is "not
even protected."207 Justice Scalia then compared his list of
classifications that do not involve protected classes under the
Fourteenth Amendment with the First Amendment's not requiring an
exception for "religious objectors to neutral rules," citing Smith.208 It
is worth noting that Justice Scalia did not include sexual orientation
on his list of classifications that do not involve protected classes.209
200. One rare departure from this pattern is found in the Court's doctrinal treatment
of dormant commerce clause claims where evidence of either discriminatory purpose or
effect is sufficient to heighten judicial scrutiny.
201. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
202. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984.
203. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
204. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
205. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256,272 (1979).
206. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 207 (2008).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 208.
209. In addition to "religious objectors to neutral rules," Justice Scalia listed other
classifications that do not trigger constitutional protection, including disability (citing City
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In Martinez, Justice Alito came very close to suggesting that
religious adherents might be a suspect class deserving of heightened
protection. In a footnote criticizing Justice Stevens' reference to
religious "status" as opposed to belief, Justice Alito suggests that
reference to "the religion into which a person was born or the religion
of a person's ancestors" would involve "immutable characteristics"
that cannot be reduced to viewpoint.210 He commented subsequently
that not all Christians agree with the CLS viewpoint on sexual
morality and suggested that it is only those who share this sexual
morality viewpoint who are threatened with "marginalization."21 1
While this sense of fundamentalist Christians or fundamentalist
religious adherents as a suspect class permeates the logic of Justice
Alito's dissenting opinion, he nonetheless stopped short of arguing
directly that fundamentalist Christians are a suspect class deserving of
heightened judicial protection.
X. The Equal Burden to Prove Invidious Intent
If the Court is aligning its treatment of incidental effects or
disparate impact across doctrines, then this suggests a path for CLS
and other groups who feel they have been subjected to unequal
treatment. In short, they simply must prove intent. They must
attempt to prove what Justice Alito's dissenting opinion repeatedly
alleged, that the government's purported non-discriminatory interests
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)), and age (citing Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991)). He also listed poverty (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 91 (1980)). As I have argued elsewhere, while the Court
in Harris boldly asserted that the Court had "held repeatedly that poverty, standing alone,
is not a suspect classification," Harris, 448 U.S. at 323, the Court cited as support for this
proposition only James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). However, it hardly seems fair to
interpret James as involving a classification discriminating against poor persons when the
Court explicitly rejected Justice Marshall's dissenting argument that the voter initiative
amending California's constitution to require local majority voter prior to construction of
low-rent housing discriminated against poor persons. Instead, the Court in James upheld
the amendment based on the majority's insistence that it discriminated only against
"persons advocating low-income housing." James, 402 U.S. at 142. Other major cases
relating to poverty similarly did not involve facts requiring the Court to determine
whether poor people are a suspect class or whether poverty is a suspect classification, such
as Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), which involved discrimination between
larger and smaller families, and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), which involved poorer and wealthier school districts. See Julie A. Nice,
No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules of Law, &
Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 629, 645-49 (2008).
210. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3011, n.5 (Alito, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 3019.
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were merely a pretext for discriminatory purpose. Presumably they
might accomplish this using any of the methods available to plaintiffs
alleging disparate impact in an equal protection context, as outlined
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.212 For example, they might show that the discrimination was
facial or overt, such as the discrimination against religious content in
Rosenberger or the hostility to the SDS in Healy."' They might show
that the discrimination was unexplainable on grounds other than
invidious discrimination or animosity or prejudice, such as the pattern
of denying permits to Chinese laundries in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,214 or
the sweeping prohibition of all governmental protection of gays in
Romer v. Evans, 1 or the pattern of allowing high density occupancy
buildings except when requested by a disabled group home in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.216 Or they might show that the
intent was evident from the record, such as the legislative statements
expressing the desire to prevent "hippie communes" from receiving
food stamps in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.217 Finally,
they might show that the government departed from normal
procedural practices or substantive considerations in developing or
applying the policy, which might be gleaned from circumstantial
evidence, as the dissent argued in Martinez.
Failing to prove that the discrimination was intentionally
invidious seems to be where CLS lost this case. Justice Alito made a
vigorous attempt to argue that Hastings had changed its policy so as
to discriminate against fundamentalist Christians. The fact that it was
CLS that had changed its own policy in 2004 probably didn't help his
cause. Nonetheless, the conservative dissenters needed only to
persuade Justice Kennedy, as their potential fifth vote, that the public
212. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65
(1977) (identifying various factors relevant to determining the government's intent,
including the impact of the government's action, the historical background of the action
and the sequence of events leading to the action, any departures from regular procedure
or normal substantive considerations, and any evidence in legislative or administrative
record).
213. Healy, 408 U.S. at 169.
214. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
215. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
216. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 432.
217. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). In addition to the
antipathy toward hippies, the Moreno Court also rejected the government's "wholly
unsubstantiated assumptions" about food stamp fraud being more likely in households of
unrelated persons. Id. at 535.
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law school adopted its nondiscrimination policy, not only to further
diversity and tolerance, but also to discriminate against those who
believe same-sex conduct is immoral. This they simply failed to do.
Reconsider that CLS might have been enticed to pursue its
challenge to the Hastings policy all the way to the Supreme Court by
the Court's lines of decisions protecting anti-gay expression in Hurley,
Dale, and Rumsfeld, as well as those protecting religious expression in
educational settings, exemplified by Rosenberger. CLS easily might
have deduced from these decisions that changing its policy-to make
the exclusion of those who are gay and those who defend gays
integral to its expressive association-would provide the necessary
factual predicate for constitutional protection by the Court. If so,
CLS teetered on a very tight rope. Here, and in a variety of related
contexts, CLS and its conservative allies frequently claim they harbor
no animosity toward gays as a class, and specifically disclaim any
discrimination based on status or identity. Presumably this argument
is strategically important so as to ensure that any law discriminating
against gays will not be deemed to be based on animosity and thus
will not be subject to invalidation under the logic of Romer. Now add
Lawrence to the mix and its reaffirmation in Martinez that
discriminating against same-sex conduct constitutes discrimination
against gays as a class of persons. A refrain seems to be emerging
that governmental discrimination against gays based on status,
identity, or conduct is not allowed. It should come as no surprise then
that CLS attempts to carve out belief or ideology as one last
remaining basis to protect discrimination against same-sex sexuality.
Unfortunately for CLS, Martinez effectively foreclosed this last path
for using the Constitution to protect moral disapproval of
homosexuality. Thus, should CLS complain that the government's
decision to afford equal treatment to gays has trumped its liberty to
receive governmental support for moral disapproval of gays, it would
appear to be right.
Conclusion
Justice O'Connor, in her classic pragmatic and wise manner,
cautioned against "reliance on categorical platitudes" when bedrock
218
constitutional principles conflict. Writing a concurrence in
Rosenberger, Justice O'Connor insisted that resolving such difficult
disputes "instead depends on the hard task of judging-sifting
218. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 847 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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through the details" and sometimes drawing "quite fine" lines.21 9 This
is an apt reminder of the Court's responsibility to take great care in
making reasoned judgments. The challenge, especially heightened in
First Amendment cases, is that both the facts and the doctrines
provide an array of options for framing and deciding any particular
dispute.
The Court framed Martinez as involving only indirect
governmental pressure via conditions on subsidies to ensure non-
discrimination by student organizations in a university's limited public
forum. This combination of factors provided the basis for the Court
to distinguish the case from precedents otherwise similar with regard
to one factor or another. The Court did not order the university to
subsidize religious exercise as it had in Rosenberger. The Court did
not apply the higher scrutiny it had used for infringements of
expressive association in the sex discrimination trilogy, Jaycees,
Rotary Club, and New York State Club. It did not perpetuate its prior
presumption that displaying an openly gay identity somehow
inherently expresses an ideological message, nor did it allow CLS to
exclude gays to protect its message, as it had in the sexual orientation
duo, Hurley and Dale.
But Martinez is no outlier. Time and again, from among the
array of options, the Court's constitutional decisions turn not merely
on the nature and extent of infringement of an individual or group's
liberty, but more specifically on whether the government's regulation
has infringed liberty in an intentionally discriminatory manner. As
Martinez demonstrates, however, one Justice's neutrality is another
Justice's pretext. Discrimination is often in the eye of the beholder.
Moreover, a comparison of the line-up of Justices in Martinez as
compared to Ysursa revealed that the reasoning followed by any
particular Justice may fluctuate depending on the specific facts and
context as well.
The crux of Martinez seems to be that CLS simply failed to
persuade a majority of the Court that Hastings enacted or applied its
nondiscrimination policy for recognition of student groups at least in
part because of its adverse effect on fundamentalist Christians.
Martinez thus effectively brings cases involving incidental effects on
expressive association into the broader equality fold, requiring proof
of intent before such incidental effect or disparate impact will raise
the Court's suspicion and its scrutiny. Whether or not this general
219. Id.
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rule is sufficiently protective of liberty or equality,2 0 at least the Court
is tending toward greater consistency by aligning expressive
association with the other constitutional doctrines protecting equality.
Finally, rather than perceiving Martinez as merely about equality
trumping liberty, consider that the decision may have the effect of
enhancing liberty as well. Martinez appeared to end the Court's prior
conflation of gay identity with gay-rights ideology by refusing to
perpetuate the presumption that the mere presence of an openly gay
member in the Christian Legal Society necessarily would alter the
organization's message. By effectively refusing to conflate openly gay
identity with any ideological expression, Martinez enhances liberty,
making space for an individual to embrace any religious ideology
regardless of his or her sexual orientation.
220. For a broader critique of the Court's Equal Protection jurisprudence, see Julie A.
Nice, Equal Protection's Antinomies and the Promise of a Co-Constitutive Approach, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1392 (2000).
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